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EMPLOYER LIABILITY-PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ACT-INJURED EMPLOYEE-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
held that the Dual Capacity Doctrine, which allows an injured em-
ployee to sue his or her employer outside of the Workmens Com-
pensation Act, will only apply if the employee was injured while
not performing his or her job function.
Heath v. Church's Fried Chicken, 519 Pa. 274, 546 A.2d 1120
(1988).
Inez Heath, while engaged in her duties as an employee of
Church's Fried Chicken (Church's), was severely injured while us-
ing a "chicken saw" that was designed and manufactured by
Church's.' Following her injury, Heath applied for and received
workmen's compensation benefits.2 In addition, Heath sought fur-
ther recovery from Church's by filing an action in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia in trespass and assumpsit 3 Heath
based her claim on causes of action for breach of warranty, negli-
gence, and strict products liability, all arising from the allegedly
defective nature of the chicken saw manufactured by Church's.4
Heath contended that under the dual capacity doctrine (DCD), an
employer who would normally be shielded from tort liability under
the exclusivity provision of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compen-
sation Act (WCA)5 could become liable in tort to its employees if it
occupied a second legal capacity which created in the employer ob-
ligations independent of its obligations as an employer.' Since
Church's was the manufacturer of the chicken saw, Heath argued
that Church's occupied a second, or dual, capacity as a manufac-
turer, and could therefore be sued in tort.7 In the court of common
pleas, Church's moved for summary judgment based on a defense
of employer immunity arising from the exclusivity provision of the
1. Heath v. Church's Fried Chicken, 519 Pa. 274, 546 A.2d 1120 (1988).
2. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-1534 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1987). The purpose of
workmen's compensation is to allow an employee a guaranteed recovery under the statute
with the quid pro quo of limited liability for the employer. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 65.11 (1987).
3. Id. Heath v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 13 Phila. 306 (1984).
4. 519 Pa. 276, 546 A.2d at 1121.
5. See supra n.2.
6. 13 Phila. at 307.
7. Id.
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WCA.s Church's argued that the WCA provided limited liability
for an employer in exchange for a specified recovery for an em-
ployee, and that the WCA excluded any other remedy an employee
may otherwise have against an employer.9 Based on this argument,
Church's motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial
court.10
Heath subsequently appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, who affirmed the grant of summary judgment in all re-
spects. 1 Upon petition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted
allocatur.1
2
Justice McDermott, writing for the majority, 3 first addressed
the issue of whether a products liability action could be brought
against an employer that manufactured the machinery that injured
the employee.' The majority began its analysis by stating that in
order for Heath to prevail in her appeal, the court would have had
to have found that Church's could' be sued under the "dual-capac-
ity" doctrine 15 that the court had earlier endorsed in Tatrai v.
Presbyterian University Hospital.6 In examining whether the
dual capacity exception applied in this case, Justice McDermott
analyzed the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. School District
of Philadelphia,'7 in which the court held that the focus of the
dual capacity exception was on the circumstances surrounding the
workmen's injury.' s If the employee's compensable injury occurred
while she was actually doing her job, then the dual capacity excep-
8. 519 Pa. 276, 546 A.2d 1121. Quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, 481(a) (Purdon Supp.
1989), " the liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and
all other liability to such employes, his legal representative, . . . or anyone otherwise enti-
tled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as




11. 359 Pa.Super. 632, 515 A.2d 621 (1986).
12. 519 Pa. 274, 546 A.2d 1120 (1988).
13. 519 Pa. 274, 546 A.2d 1120 (1988).
14. Id. at 276, 546 A.2d at 1121.
15. Id. Under the dual capacity doctrine, "an employer normally shielded from tort
liability by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if
he occupies, in addition to his capacity as employer , a second capacity that confers on him
obligations independent of those imposed on him as an employer." 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 72.80 at 14-112 (1976).
16. 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (1982). See infra notes 79 to 92 and accompanying
text.
17. 517 Pa. 461, 538 A.2d 862 (1988). See infra note 108 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
18. Id. at 475, 538 A.2d at 869.
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tion could not apply.19 As Heath was in fact performing her job at
the time of her injury, the majority held that the dual capacity
doctrine did not apply, and therefore, the WCA provided Heath's
exclusive remedy.2"
Justice Papadakos joined the opinion, and also filed a separate
concurring opinion in which he stated that he reluctantly joined
the majority because the issue was controlled by a statutory
scheme imposed by the legislature.21 Justice Papadakos' opinion
called upon the legislature to redress the injustice done to the in-
jured party in the present case, and the employees in Lewis,
Poyser v. Newman and Co, Inc.22 and Budzichowski v. Bell Tele-
phone Co. of Pennsylvania;23 cases that the majority relied upon in
reaching its holding in the present case. 4
Justice Larsen, joined by Justice Stout, filed a dissenting opinion
that focused on Heath's role as the ultimate user of a manufac-
tured product.25 The dissent noted that under the majority's hold-
ing, workers would be increasingly disadvantaged by a workmen's
compensation system that was originally devised and enacted for
their benefit. 26 Relying upon his dissent in Lewis, Justice Larsen
pointed out that employees may have had many other relation-
ships with their employers such as landlord/tenant or seller/ buyer
and that the laws that governed those relationships should have
determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. In the present
case, Justice Larsen reasoned, Heath sought to hold her employer
liable, not as an employer, but as the manufacturer of the product
that caused her injury.28 The dissent emphasized the general un-
fairness of allowing others, who were not employed by the manu-
facturer of a defective product, to have a cause of action against
that manufacturer, but not allowing an injured employee to sue
her employer, if that employer happened to be the manufacturer of
the product in question.29 Furthermore, Justice Larsen pointed out
19. Id.
20. 519 Pa. at 277, 546 A.2d at 1121.
21. Id.
22. Id. 514 Pa. 32, 522 A.2d 548 (1987). See infra note 94-100 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this case.
23. 503 Pa. 160, 469 A.2d 111 (1983). See infra note 101-107 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this case.
24. 519 Pa. at 277, 546 A.2d at 1121.
25. Id.
26. Id.





that as long as the courts allowed the WCA to limit an employer/
manufacturer's liability, then "the deterrent aspect of strict liabil-
ity law will be seriously undermined" and an employer/manufac-
turer would have no incentive to produce safe devices."
Finally, Justice Larsen argued that the supreme court in Tatrai
ruled that where a service was provided to the public, a duty
flowed from the provider to the general public, including employ-
ees who used the service.3 1 Since Heath alleged in her complaint
that the chicken saws were designed, produced, and sold to the
public as a business by Church's, and Church's in its answer de-
nied selling the saws to the public, this raised an issue of fact, and
therefore, the trial court should not have granted Church's motion
for summary judgment.2
In order to put the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Heath into perspective, it is helpful to have some background on
workmen's compensation and the dual capacity doctrine. Work-
men's compensation law developed early in this century for two
main reasons.3 3 The first, and less well-known of the two reasons,
was economic in nature: to make the cost of work-related injuries a
part of the cost of producing goods and services, thereby placing
the ultimate cost of worker injuries on the consumer.3 4 The second
and more well known reason was to eliminate notions of fault by
allowing an employee to receive a small, but assured, remedy for
his work-related injuries while his employer received full immunity
from all common law claims in tort by the employee. 35 In Pennsyl-
vania, this latter purpose was legislatively embodied in the exclu-
sive remedy provision of the WCA.3 6 Under the exclusive remedy
provision, an employee's remedy for a work-related injury was lim-
ited to that remedy provided under the provisions of the WCA, as
determined by a workmen's compensation referee.3 7 No other rem-
30. Id.
31. Id. The court in Tatrai, 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1168, said: "There is no
reason to distinguish appellant from any other member of the public injured during the
course of treatment. The risk of injury which the appellant suffered was a risk to which any
member of the general public receiving like treatment would have been subjected." Id.
32. 519 Pa. at 279, 546 A.2d at 1122.
33. See infra note 34.
34. Davis, Workmen's Compensation- Using an Enterprise Theory of Employment
to Determine Who is a Third Party Tortfeasor, 32 U. PITT L. REv. 289, 292 (1971).
35. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1.10 (1978), See also Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Hartlieb, 465 Pa. 249, 348 A.2d 746 (1975).
36. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 481(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988). See supra note 8 for a text of
this section.
37. 1 BARBIERI, PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.07(1) (1988).
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edy was available to an injured employee S.3 Thus, under the WCA
in Pennsylvania, an injured employee no longer had a common law
cause of action against his employer for any injury covered by the
WCA.39 In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the
WCA simply deprived the courts of common pleas of jurisdiction
over any common law claim in tort by an employee against his
employer.4
It is very important to note, however, that under the exclusivity
scheme, an employee retained his right to sue a third party if the
injury was caused by the third party while the employee was in the
scope of his employment."' In fact, it was the third party liability
scheme which led to the development of the DCD. 2 In essence, the
DCD sought to allow an employee to sue his employer, but as a
third party, if the employer possessed a second capacity which was
independent of its capacity as an employer, e.g. landlord, land pos-
sessor, or manufacturer."3 For the purposes of the WCA, an em-
ployer could have two separate capacities, one of which was im-
mune from tort liability, while the other retained full tort
liability." Therefore, whether or not the DCD was applied became
a factual question: Did the employer engage in sufficient activities
to be classified as a third party under the WCA?45
The DCD first arose in the California case of Duprey v. Shane."'
In Duprey, a chiropractor negligently treated his employee after
she was injured in the scope of her employment.47 The chiroprac-
tor's treatment aggravated the employee's injuries. s The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the WCA did not exclude the chiro-
practor from a common law medical malpractice suit, reasoning
that when the chiropractor decided to treat his injured employee,
he took on the duties and responsibilities of any other doctor (his
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Kline v. Arden H. Verner Co., 503 P. 251, 469 A.2d 158 (1983).
41. Id. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 481(b) (Purdon 1987). The statute reads in part: "In
the event injury or death to an employe is caused by a third party, then such employe . . .
may bring their action at law against such third party. ... Id. See also Creighan v. Fire-
men's Relief and Pension Fund Bd. of City of Pittsburgh, 397 Pa. 419, 155 A.2d 844 (1959).
42. Comment, The Dual Capacity Doctrine: Piercing the Exclusive Remedy of
Worker's Compensation, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1982).
43. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 72.81(a) at 14-229 (1988).
44. Id. 72.81(c) at 14-244 (1988).
45. Id.
46. 39 Cal.2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
47. Id. at 784, 249 P.2d at 11.
48. Id.
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second capacity) and the employment relationship was effectively
terminated."9
California was also the first jurisdiction to adopt the DCD in a
products liability setting in the 1977 case of Douglas v. E. & J.
Gallo Winery.5° In Douglas, employees of the winery sued in tort
to recover damages for personal injuries they suffered when scaf-
folding manufactured by Gallo, upon which they were working, col-
lapsed.51 The California Supreme Court held that the employer, as
the manufacturer of a defective scaffolding which was also sold to
the public,52 was liable to its employees because Gallo took on the
second separate capacity of manufacturer. The employer was held
liable in its second capacity because the second capacity generated
obligations and duties flowing to the employee which were unre-
lated to Gallo's duties and obligations as an employer. 3 The Court,
however, limited the holding in this case to an employer who man-
ufactured the defective product for sale to the general public as
well as for its own use.
5 4
The DCD was also adopted by Ohio 55 and Illinois6 in the late
seventies and early eighties. In the Ohio case, Mercer v. Uniroyal,
Inc.,57 the employee, a truck driver, was injured when an employer-
manufactured tire on the truck he was driving blew out, causing an
accident in which Mercer, the employee, was injured.58 The em-
ployee recovered workmen's compensation benefits.59 The em-
ployee then brought suit to recover against his employer in tort."
The trial court granted summary judgment for Uniroyal. 1 How-
ever, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, allowing the employee a
49. Id. at 786, 249 P.2d at 13. The court in Duprey stated "[lt is our conclusion that,
when the employing doctor elected to treat the industrial injury, the duties and obligations
growing out of the employer-employee relationship terminated, and the doctor assumed the
same responsibilities that any doctor would have assumed had he been called in on the case.
As will be pointed out, such third party doctor can be sued for malpractice resulting in an
aggravation of an industrial injury, or a new injury. It follows that the employer-doctor may
be sued for malpractice when he elects to treat the industrial injury." Id.
50. 69 Cal.App.3d 103, 137 Cal.Rptr. 797 (1977).
51. Id. at 104, 137 Cal.Rptr. at 798.
52. Id. at 107 n.1, 137 Cal.Rptr. at 799 n.1.
53. Id. at 109, 137 Cal.Rptr. at 803.
54. 69 Cal.App.3d at 109, 137 Cal.Rptr. at 803.
55. Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 275, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1977).
56. Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, 77 Ill.2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979).
57. 49 Ohio App. 275, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1977).






separate common law tort recovery based on a breach of warranty
theory.6 2 The Court reasoned that Mercer did not sue as an em-
ployee, but rather as a reasonably foreseeable user of a product.6 3
In other words, the hazard to which the employee was exposed was
not one of employment, but "was common to the public in gen-
eral"."' Therefore, the defendant Uniroyal, for the purposes of its
employee's injury, acted in a dual capacity as a tire manufacturer,
which conferred duties and obligations upon Uniroyal independent
of its obligations as an employer, and which allowed its employee
to recover outside of the Ohio WCA. 6
Illinois adopted the dual capacity doctrine in 1979 in Smith v.
Metropolitan Sanitary District.6 6 In Smith, the employee was in-
jured by a defective truck leased to a joint venture by one of the
parties involved in the joint-venture (the plaintiff was employed by
the joint-venture). 7 The issue was whether the employer was im-
mune to the liability imposed upon other lessors whose defective
leased property caused injury because, in addition to being the les-
sor of the defective truck, the employer was also a member of the
joint venture that employed Smith. 8 The Illinois Supreme Court
answered in the negative, allowing the employee a recovery in
tort. 9 The Court applied the DCD and stated that the employer
here occupied a second, completely separate, legal capacity as a
lessor, and was therefore strictly liable to Smith in its capacity as
lessor.70 The Court came to this conclusion by reasoning that
Smith's right to bring this particular action should not have de-
pended on whether the defective truck was leased to Smith's em-
ployer by one of its members, or by another lessor that had no
other ties to the employee's joint-venture employer.7 1 Additionally,
the court reasoned that the employer's liability should not depend
on whether it was solely a lessor, or was a lessor that coincidentally
occupied the status of a party to the joint-venture that employed
Smith.72




66. 77 I1.2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979).
67. Id. at 315, 396 N.E.2d at 526.







Most other states have either rejected the DCD or have reserved
judgment on it. 3 The reason for this rejection or indecision ap-
peared to be the fact that, in the states where the DCD was ac-
cepted, the DCD was seen by many commentators to have under-
mined the exclusivity provision of the WCA, and therefore, the
whole machinery of the WCA itself.74 As a result of this perceived
invalidation of the exclusivity provision, the California legislature
abolished the DCD in 1982, opting instead for an increased sched-
ule of benefits written into the California Workmen's Compensa-
tion statute.75 Additionally, in 1983, the Ohio Supreme Court in
Freese v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,7 6 replaced the DCD in Ohio
with the dual persona doctrine, espoused by Professor Larson in
his treatise on workmen's compensation.7 7 The dual persona doc-
trine appeared to be much more restrictive and logically compati-
ble with the intended purpose of the WCA's exclusivity provision
than the DCD. 8
In Pennsylvania, the first case with dual capacity overtones was
Tatrai v Presbyterian University Hospital,79 which was decided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1982. In Tatrai, the plain-
tiff, a hospital employee, was injured by a falling X-ray machine
after being told by her supervisor to report to the hospital emer-
gency room rather than to the employee health service provided
free by the hospital to its employees.8 0 The issue in this case was
whether the hospital could effectively defend a common law negli-
gence action by an injured employee by using the exclusivity provi-
sion of the Pennsylvania WCA.18 In answering this question, the
73. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 21, 72.83 at 14-252.
74. Id. 72.81(a) at 14-229.
75. Id. 72.81(c) at 14-243. Assembly Bill No. 684 sec. 6, amending § 3602 of the Labor
Code (Calif. 1982).
76. 4 Ohio St.3d 5, 445 N.E.2d 1110 (1983). The plaintiff, a motorcycle policeman,
was injured when his motorcycle hit a pothole in the street. The plaintiff sued the city, for
which he worked, for negligence. The court held that the DCD did not apply in this case,
and said that the doctrine would apply only if the employer had a second legal capacity so
completely independent of its capacity as an employer as to create a separate legal person.
Id., 4 Ohio St.3d 5, 445 N.E.2d 1110.
77. 2A A. Larson 72.81 at 14-229 (1988). "An employer may become a third person,
vulnerable to tort suit by an employee, if-and only if-he possesses a second persona so com-
pletely independent from and unrelated to his status as an employer that by established
standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal person." Id.
78. Id.
79. 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (1982).
80. 497 Pa. at 248, 439 A.2d at 1163.
81. Id. See supra note 8 for a text of the exclusivity provision.
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court gave two separate rationales for its answer.8 2 Justice Nix83
determined that Tatrai, an employee of the hospital, was not in
the course and scope of her employment when her injuries oc-
curred." ' Therefore, the workmen's compensation statute did not
apply, and Tatrai was not precluded from suing her employer in
tort. 5 However, the concurring majority opinion of Justice Roberts
used a different rationale to reach the same result as Justice Nix.
6
Justice Roberts reasoned that it was irrelevant whether or not the
employee's injury arose in the scope of her employment.8 7 Rather,
the relevant conclusion was that the hospital acted in a separate
capacity when it chose to treat its employee in a medical facility
open to the general public.88 Therefore, the hospital owed its em-
ployee the very same duty that it owed to any other patient.8 " In
essence, the fact that Tatrai was an employee was not a sufficient
basis upon which to distinguish her from any other patient.90 Con-
sequently, Justice Roberts reasoned that the exclusivity provision
of the WCA would not bar Tatrai's recovery in this case. 1 Thus,
recovery was available for the employee outside the workmen's
compensation statute.2
In addition to Tatrai, there were three other cases that the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania discussed in Heath.3 Along with Ta-
82. Id.
83. Justice Nix wrote alone. Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion which was
joined by Chief Justice O'Brien and Justices Larsen and Flaherty. Justices Kauffman and
Wilkinson did not participate.
84. 497 Pa. at 250, 439 A.2d at 1163.
85. 497 Pa. at 250, 439 A.2d at 1163-64. The court here quotes 77 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 411 (Purdon 1987) which stated that injury arising out of the scope of employment
"shall include all other injuries sustained while the employee is actually engaged in the
furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer. Id.







93. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Heath did not discuss two other Pennsylva-
nia cases in which recovery under the DCD was expressly denied. In Kohr v. Raybestos
Manhattan, Inc. et al., 522 F. Supp. 1070 (1981), an asbestosis case, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania flatly rejected the DCD. Id. Addition-
ally, in Kosowan v. MDC Industries, Inc., 319 Pa. Super. 91, 465 A.2d 1069 (1983), the
employee, Kosowan, was injured when he fell through a rotted portion of a wooden walkway
surrounding a water tank that his employer had contracted to dismantle. Id. at 92, 465 A.2d
at 1070. In Kosowan, the Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the DCD, stating that the
clear and unambiguous language of the worker's compensation statute clearly precluded any
additional recovery by an employee where his injury arose within the scope of his employ-
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trai, these three cases established the history of the DCD in Penn-
sylvania. The first case, Budzichowski v. Bell Telephone Co. 4,
decided in 1983, involved a telephone installer who sued, for al-
leged negligent medical treatment, both the telephone company for
which he worked, and the company physicians who treated him
after he received a work-related injury. 8 The issue was whether or
not Bell Telephone was acting in a dual capacity as both the pro-
vider of medical care and as an employer when Budzichowski re-
ceived his negligent medical treatment so that Bell Telephone was
liable to Budzichowski despite the exclusivity provision of the
WCA. 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that both the phy-
sicians and Bell Telephone were not operating in a dual capacity
when the alleged negligent medical treatment occurred. 7 The
court held, as distinguished from Tatrai, that as the employee was
not treated in medical facilities open to the public, the employee
would not have been treated but for his employment relationship
with Bell.98 Therefore, Bell Telephone, in treating the injured em-
ployee, was merely fulfilling one of its duties as an employer, so
consequently no dual capacity existed.99 However, the court ex-
pressly recognized the existence of the DCD in Pennsylvania. 100
The next case that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed
in Heath was Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc.,10 1 in which the em-
ployee was injured while using a "notching machine" designed and
manufactured by Newman, the employer. 102 The DCD was not put
forward by Poyser as a ground for allowing a recovery in tort.
10 3
Rather, Poyser attempted to pierce the WCA's exclusivity provi-
sion by showing that Newman had in effect intentionally caused
Poyser's injuries by omitting from the employer-manufactured
"notching machine" several federally mandated safety devices. 04
ment and was related thereto. Id. at 94, 465 A.2d at 1072. The court went on to state that
the Supreme Court in the Tatrai case did not really adopt the DCD because Ms. Tatrai was
simply not in the scope of her employment at the time her injury took place, therefore the
Worker's Compensation Act did not apply to Tatrai's injuries at all. Id.
94. 503 Pa. 160, 469 A.2d 111 (1983).
95. 503 Pa. at 160, 469 A.2d at 111.
96. 503 Pa. at 161, 469 A.2d at 112.
97. Id at 168, 469 A.2d at 115.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 167, 469 A.2d at 114.
101. 514 Pa. 32, 522 A.2d 548 (1987).





The issue was whether the employee's assertion that his work re-
lated injury was caused by "deliberate derelictions" of his em-
ployer could have operated to take the employee's action out of
exclusivity clause of the WCA.1 °5 The court denied recovery for
Poyser on the ground that such an exception to the exclusivity
provision was not written into the Pennsylvania WCA, and
whether or not such an exception existed was for legislative, rather
than judicial, determination.'" However, in dicta, the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court again affirmed that the DCD did exist in
Pennsylvania.107
Finally, in Lewis v. School District of Philadelphia,"8 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court formulated the DCD as it exists today and
as it was used by that court in Heath. In Lewis, the plaintiff was
employed by the Philadelphia. School District as a bus driver.'0 9
While driving his bus, Lewis was injured in an accident involving a
uninsured motorist.1 0 As a result of his injuries, Lewis received
workmen's compensation benefits.1 However, Lewis also de-
manded that his employer pay him additional monies pursuant to
the Pennsylvania Uninsured Motorist Act,11 2 since the school dis-
trict was self-insured.1 The issue was whether or not the Pennsyl-
vania WCA provided the sole remedy for an employee injured in
this type of situation. 14 The court answered in the affirmative,
stating that the WCA was the exclusive basis for employee recov-
ery as far as the employer was concerned. 1 5 The court then ana-
lyzed whether the school district could have been sued under the
DCD in its status as an insurer, i.e. whether liability arose, not
from the school district's status as an employer, but rather "from
its status as an insurance carrier.""' The court, in denying Lewis a
recovery, stated that the focus of the DCD was on the circum-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 35, 522 A.2d at 551.
107. 514 Pa. at 36 n.4, 522 A.2d at 550 n.4.
108. 517 Pa 461, 538 A.2d 862 (1988).
109. Id. at 464, 538 A.2d at 863.
110. Id. at 465, 538 A.2d at 863.
111. Id.
112. Id. The court was referring to 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2000 et seq. which re-
quired that auto insurance companies covering personal injury liability must have also pro-
vided protection against uninsured motorists. Id.
113. 517 Pa. at 465, 538 A.2d at 863.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 470, 538 A.2d at 866.
116. Id. at 474, 538 A.2d at 868.
1989
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stances in which the injury occurred. 117 The DCD exception could
not be applied when, as in Lewis' case, "the injury occurred while
he was actually engaged in the performance of his job.""' In other
words, when the employee was actually performing his job, the em-
ployment relationship was of such paramount importance that no
other relationship between the employer and the employee was ju-
dicially recognized in Pennsylvania. 1 9
As Lewis showed, the DCD was a recognized exception to the
exclusivity provision of the WCA in Pennsylvania, but the DCD
could never be applied if the employee was actually performing his
or her job when his or her injury occurred. Since Lewis was fol-
lowed by the majority in Heath as precedent, it is easily under-
stood why Heath lost her case against Church's, as Heath was us-
ing the chicken saw in her work when she was injured. In fact, that
was the extent of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's analysis in
Heath. The majority in Heath merely made a summary application
of the holding in Lewis to the facts in Heath. Therefore, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's holding in Heath was good law, at least
in that it followed and reaffirmed the existence of the DCD, and
when the doctrine would not be applied by the courts in
Pennsylvania.
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never said in
which cases the DCD would be applied. There has never been a
case in Pennsylvania in which the doctrine, as formulated in Lewis
and Heath, was successfully used by an injured employee to re-
cover against his employer outside of the confines of the WCA.
The question that really must be answered is: under what employ-
ment circumstances must an employee have been injured so that
the employee can recover workmen's compensation benefits and si-
multaneously recover a reward from his employer under another
legal theory, such as strict products liability or negligence? In or-
der to answer this question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
holdings in Lewis and Heath must be read in conjunction with the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act. Recall first that the
Act applied to, and provided the exclusive remedy for, injuries re-
ceived by an employee that arose "in the course of his employ-
ment" and were related thereto." ° Second, injuries caused by a
117. Id. at 475, 538 A.2d at 869.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411(1) (1987). See also Krawchuck v. Phila. Elec. Co.,
497 Pa. 115, 439 A.2d 627 (1981).
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third party, but which still arose in the course of employment,
were not covered exclusively by the WCA; hence the origin of the
DCD-the injured employee could sue the responsible "third
party" whether he was the employer or not.12" ' The phrase "injury
arising in the course of his employment" referred to all injuries
sustained by the employee while he was actually performing his
job,'22 whether the employee was on the employer's premises or
not. Furthermore, the Act covered injuries sustained by the em-
ployee when he was not actually performing his job, if he was on
the premises of the employer and his presence there was required
by the nature of the employment.
2 3
Upon review, several ideas become evident from the above. First,
an employee could have always sued his employer if the employer-
caused injury did not occur while the employee was in the "course
and scope" of his employment. In fact, the employee could not
have recovered any workmen's compensation benefits in this situa-
tion. This was so because the WCA did not apply at all in this
case, rather, standard principles of negligence would have been ap-
plied. Secondly, from the DCD as formulated in Heath and Lewis,
the only remedy available to an employee injured while actually
performing his job was that which was provided by the WCA.
Therefore, using the Heath court's reasoning, the only time an em-
ployee could assert the DCD successfully and recover under both
the WCA and another legal theory, was if the employee was in-
jured while in the course and scope of employment, but he was not
actually performing his job. According to the standard judicial in-
terpretation of the WCA, this occurred when the employee was not
engaged in his work, but was on the premises of the employer be-
cause the nature of the employment required the employee to be
there. This time period included lunch time,1
24 employee use of
bathroom facilities, 2 5 employee preparation to begin or to leave
work, 2' and other similar situations.
Therefore, in the above situations, it seems likely that if an in-
jured employee could have proved his or her injury arose from a
relationship which was distinct from the employer/employee rela-
121. Id.
122. Pypers v. W.C.A.B. (Baker), 105 Pa. Commw. 448, 524 A.2d 1046,(1987).
123. Newhouse v. W.C.A.B. (Harris Cleaning Service, Inc.) 109 Pa. Commw. 96, 530
A.2d 545 (1987).
124. Cozza v. W.C.A.B. 32 Pa. Commw. 554, 379 A.2d 1089 (1977).
125. Id.
126. Epler v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d 1163 (1978).
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tionship, and that that relationship had invoked a different set of
obligations flowing from the employer to the employee, then there
should have been no reason why the DCD would not have allowed
an injured employee to sue and recover from his or her employer
outside of the WCA.
In the final analysis, the Pennsylvania formulation of the dual
capacity doctrine affords some measure of relief, at least in prod-
ucts liability cases, to employees who were injured by an employer-
manufactured item. However, that relief does not reach an injured
employee in Heath's situation, where Heath was actually working
when she was injured. In Heath, the chicken saw may have been
negligently manufactured by Church's, or perhaps Church's pur-
posely manufactured the chicken saw in a substandard fashion in
an attempt to take advantage of its limited liability to its own
workers under the WCA. For an employer of the latter frame of
mind, the deterrent aspect of the law of strict products liability
means little or nothing.12
At this point, another look at Justice Larsen's dissenting opinion
in Heath seems appropriate, for Justice Larsen was concerned
about the situation previously discussed, that Heath, and others
like her, unfortunately have found themselves in all too often. Jus-
tice Larsen began his dissent by pointing out that employees have
historically enjoyed relationships with their employers other than
the employment relationship, and the laws that governed each re-
lationship would "determine the rights and liabilities of the par-
ties". 12 These other relationships included buyer/seller, landlord/
tenant, and others.1 29 Justice Larsen then stated that it was unfair
to preclude an injured employee from suing his employer as the
third party manufacturer of a defective product simply because he
happened to be the manufacturer's employee, when another, who
was not employed by the manufacturer clearly would have a com-
mon law cause of action against that manufacturer. Justice Larsen
then concluded that by limiting the liability of employer/manufac-
turer in cases such as Heath's, any deterrent aspect of strict prod-
ucts liability law vanished, and "Rube Goldberg" devices that have
placed production above the health of employees would continue
127. 519 Pa. at 278, 546 A.2d at 1122 (Larsen, J., dissenting), "As long as the majority
limits the liability of the manufacturer of a defective product to a workman's compensation
award in these cases, then the deterrent aspect of strict liability law will be seriously under-
mined. ... Id.




to seriously injure those same employees.1 30
In the final analysis of the dual capacity doctrine and the work-
men's compensation statute in Pennsylvania, there remains a fun-
damental problem which was faced by Heath in her law suit
against Church's Fried Chicken, and which was astutely recognized
by Justice Larsen. The problem is best illustrated by a hypotheti-
cal situation. Consider two employees, A and B. A works for the
ASD corporation and B works for the BNM corporation. Both A
and B, while engaged in their identical jobs, use a large stamping
machine which was designed and manufactured by ASD. If B,
while performing his job, is injured by the machine, Pennsylvania
law allows B to recover workmen's compensation benefits from his
employer BNM, and the law also allows B to sue ASD as a third
party manufacturer. However, if A is injured by the same defective
machine under the same circumstances as B's injury, A can only
recover workmen's compensation benefits and nothing else because
A was actually engaged in the performance of his job when he was
injured. A is precluded by Lewis and Heath from successfully em-
ploying the DCD and suing his employer for the same injury for
which B can recover against ASD. This hypothetical presents the
situation of two similarly situated individuals, A and B, being
treated differently under the laws of Pennsylvania. Only the un-
happy accident of who is employed by whom allows or precludes
recovery for A or B under the law of Pennsylvania.
In conclusion, the law concerning the dual capacity doctrine in
Pennsylvania is fairly clear and straightforward: the doctrine will
probably be applied if the injured employee was in the scope of his
or her employment, but was not actually working, when injured.
However, there is a major problem in this area of workmen's com-
pensation law as demonstrated by the above hypothetical. Individ-
uals in Inez Heath's situation are simply not receiving the legal
benefits and protection to which they are entitled. Your author,
therefore, would join with Justice Papadakos in his concurring
opinion in Heath in which the Justice calls upon the Legislature to
"review and correct the apparent injustices wrought to the injured
parties in Lewis; Poyser; Budzichowski; and in the present
case"."' Justice Papadakos seems to feel that the Pennsylvania
Legislature could easily amend the Workmen's Compensation Act
130. Id.
131. 519 Pa. at 278, 546 A.2d at 1121 (Papadakos, J., concurring).
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to rectify this situation. 32 The WCA could be amended by ex-
panding the amount of workmen's compensation benefits in situa-
tions like Heath's, in order to keep the deterrent aspect of strict
liability viable. Or, the WCA could be amended by limiting the
application of the WCA's exclusivity provision, thereby making an
employer liable to an injured employee, upon a threshold showing
by an employee that his or her employer abused the workmen's
compensation system in some way. Such abuse would include the
employer's intentional disregard of accepted or required federal or
state safety practices or procedures (such as when an employer/
manufacturer purposely omitted required safety devices, or had
manufactured a product for use by his employees in a substandard
fashion in order to save costs). Only by such legislative action will
employees in Heath's position be given the full benefit of a work-
men's compensation system enacted for their benefit.
Peter J. Sheptak
132. Id.
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